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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE ()F UTAH 
IN RE: 
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL, 
Disciplinary Proceeding 
~Case No. 
~ 11546 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
All italics are ours. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a disciplinary proceeding before the Board 
of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar. 
DISPOSITION BY 
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State 
Bar adopted the Findings and Conclusions of the Hear-
ing Committee and recommended disbarment. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, George E. Bridwell, seeks dismissal 
and vindication. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The charges involved in this disciplinary proceed-
ing arise from representation by George Bridwell of 
Precisa Calculating Machine Co., Inc., a Utah corpora-
tion and the complaining witness Eugene 'Vagner and 
his ex-wife Nellie 'Vaguer from the Fall of 1957 to the 
Fall of 1961. ·Bridwell's representation of the above 
arose from an investigation by the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue which led to large tax assessments. The initial 
nssessments at the time when Bridwell was hired 
nmounted to the sum of $90,000.00 for Precisa Calculat-
ing :Machine Co. and $94,015.12 for Eugene and Nellie 
'Vagner for 1954, 1955 and 1956. Ultimately, pmsuant 
to investigation, the following assessments were made: 
Eugene and Nellie 'Vagner, 
J ;)5.~, taxes ____ $112,878.99 
T\:nnHr ________ 73,732.66 
Tr' a) ____________ $186,611.65 
: -~~i L't-\:es ____ $169,050.89 
l ·. JJ': L ~- ________ 84,525.45 
'«·[:'.] ------------$253,576.34 
2 
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1956 taxes ----$ 85,549.09 
Penalty ________ 42, 77 4.55 
Total ____________ $128,323.64 
1957 taxes ----$ 34,004.54 
Penalty ________ 17,917.51 
Total ------------$ 50,922.05 
The total assessments for the above four years on the 
W agners amounted to $401,483.51 taxes plus penalty 
of $218,950.17 for a total of $620,533.68. The assess-
ments made after investigation on Precisa Calculating 
Machine Co. were as follows: 
1954 --------------$ 45,228.57 
19.55 
1956 
1957 
32,112.58 
34,688.28 
11,750.69 
Total ------------$123, 780.12 
At the conclusion of Bridwell's representation of the 
\Vagners and Precisa Calculating Machine Co. in 1961, 
the Wagner assessments were settled for $18,572.31 
and the assessments of Precisa Calculating Machine Co. 
were settled for $11,750.69. Thus, total assessments 
amounting to $7 44,213.80 were finally settled as a result 
of the services of George E. Bridwell for a total of 
$30,323.00 (Ex. 35). 
After Wagner was questioned by representatives 
of thf: Internal Revenue Service, he sought the services 
3 
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of Bridwell and immediately went back to Switzerland 
taking with him approximately $28,000.00 of the funds 
of Precisa Calculating Machine Co. (R. 32, 33, 34, 
241). Bridwell had represented Wagner in a divorce 
action which had been concluded prior to the time of 
this representation. Bridwell was out of the office at 
the time that Wagner sought his services, and Wagner 
left word with David Bybee then sharing space with 
Bridwell. Bridwell, on his return, commenced repre-
senting Precisa Calculating Machine Co. and the 
Wagners. 
In a letter dated October 30, 1957, Bridwell set 
forth the terms of the representation as far as fee was 
concerned (Ex. 1) . In this letter, Bridwell notified 
Wagner of the preliminary assessments against both him 
and the company, and that a tax lien had been placed 
against all company assets as well as the assets of the 
'V agners. As far as the fee arrangement was concerned, 
Bridwell stated in part as follows: 
"If you desire me to represent you in all these 
matters, I must have carte-blanche authority and 
ample expenses so that I may hire accountants 
of my own choosing to work with me. 
My fee for handling the matter all the way 
through the administrative process of the Bureau 
of Internal Revenue will be $14,000.00. Those 
processes include working with the Agents dur-
ing their preparations of final reports, then to a 
conference hearing. And if we are not then 
satisfied we will go to the Appellate staff, and 
finally to the Tax Court." 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bridwell also warned in this le'tter of the possibility of 
criminal prosecution. Bridwell further stated concern-
ing the payment of the fee: 
"I request, if you desire my services, to send 
$8,000.00 now, as a fee and expense advance. 
The balance of my fee to be paid at the rate of 
$2,000.00 per month, expenses to be paid when 
itemized." 
Precisa Calculating Machine Co., during the time 
in question, was a corporation owned primarily by one 
Mr .. Jost and a parent corporation in Switzerland known 
as Precisa A.G., with Wagner owning less than one-
fifth of the stock (R. 219). 
Bridwell obtained the services of Frank Nielson, 
a local C.P.A., to assist. Nielson is a man who was 
formerly an employee of the Internal Revenue Service 
and as such had a great deal of experience in tax fraud 
cases. As the case progressed, not only were additional 
years added, but the assessments went way up and in 
Bridwell's words (R. 330): 
"* * * this claim turned into a real can of 
worms with indicia of fraud rampant throughout 
the whole thing. Of course, I use that for want 
of a better word. The classic example of fraud 
involving Swiss banks by American citizens. 
Of course, Mr. Wagner is a nationalized citizen 
of the United States and, oh, one of the things, 
for instance, that we had to contend with - by 
'we ' I mean Mr. Nielson and with the special age~ts - were withdrawals from Utah depo~its 
in the Swiss bank accounts and money commg 
back to a New York bank where it's received 
5 
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by cashier's checks, checks are cashed, purchases 
of automobiles, property, that sort of thing." 
In the Fall of 1958, during the course of the repre-
sentation, it was decided that Bridwell and Nielson 
would go to Switzerland to personally go through all 
of the bank account records and to prepare an affidavit 
to be signed by the principal stockholders outlining the 
history of the Precisa Calculating Machine Co. and 
Wagner's part in this Company. 
Wagner himself had suggested the trip in a letter 
to Bridwell, dated June 13, 1958 (Ex. I). Bridwell 
and Nielson took the trip to Switzerland in October 
1958. They were there for approximately three weeks. 
During the time they were there, Bridwell orally dis-
cussed the fee arrangements with Wagner and the fact 
that the cases had turned out much larger than originally 
anticipated, and Wagner agreed that the fee would be 
adjusted (R. 331, 332). It had been agreed right from 
the start that Bridwell could pay himself from the cor-
porate bank account periodically (R. 332). 
The first two checks on Bridwell' s fee were also 
signed by Mr. Grothe, who was the local ranking officer 
after Wagner's departure, but later on Grothe was re-
moved from the company and Bridwell was the only 
one who could sign checks on the company bank account. 
However, the company office remained open for a 
period of time and the cancelled checks and bank state-
ments would be sent to the company address at 375 West 
4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mrs. N ewbol<l 
6 
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handled the company correspondence and business and 
later, Mrs. Wagner, the ex-wife, continued handling 
the business until the building was sealed off on a seizure 
by the Internal Revenue Service, after which time, 
there were no more banking transactions ( R. 333) . 
Exhibit F is an exhibit which shows the dates and 
amounts of the fees drawn by George Bridwell, showing 
draws through the year 1958 and a final payment in 
1961 from money refunded by the Internal Revenue 
Service after the settlement of the tax cases. This ex-
hibit shows a total amount of money collected for fee 
in the sum of $28,653.36 plus $2,000.00 in 1961 received 
from Wagner. 
Nielson was present during the trip to Switzerland 
in 1958 at times when Bridwell and Wagner discussed 
fees. Nielson supported Bridwell's version of the fee 
discussion held in Switzerland whereby it was agreed 
that the fees would be revised, and stated at R. 27 4: 
"A. - and Mr. Bridwell says, he says, 
'Frank .. .' 
And Mr. Wagner was there. 
He says, 'You will remember this because it 
may be important some day that Mr. Wagner 
owes me substantial fees on this case, Mr. 'Vag-
ner m\·es me ~;u b~;~antial fees on this case and 
there's additional fees ~hat wm be charged in 
connection with the corporatiou.' 
And I remember that individually because of 
the fact that George emphasized that to me as 
they came into the room. 
7 
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Q. Now, what did Mr. Wagner say to this? 
A. Mr. Wagner didn't say anything. He just 
- silent acknowledgment. 
Q. Was he close enough so that he could ha Ye 
heard this easily enough? 
A. Mr. Bridwell brought Mr. Wagner into 
the room specifically to say this in front of me. 
That's the only subject that was brought my 
attention to." 
During the course of this stay in Switzerland, Niel-
son audited the corporation bank account, and he and 
Bridwell prepared a voluminous affidavit outlining the 
history of the company in the United States and its 
connection with Wagner, together with attachments of 
bank statements. The affidavit outlined that \iVagner 
had embezzled certain monies from the corporation 
which he would pay back, which was the basis for a 
theory of minimizing tax liability for embezzled money. 
Bridwell represented to the I.R.S. agents that this affi-
davit would be signed by the principals involved. How-
eyer, he and Nielson left on a weekend with the under-
standing that the affidavit would be signed and for-
warded to be presented to I.R.S. However, this affi-
davit was never in fact signed (Ex. E ) . 
The expenses for the trip were primarily obtained 
from $4,000.00 paid back to the company from Metro-
politan Finance as final payment on a loan which Pre-
cisa made to Metropolitan Finance. 
8 
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Bridwell testified that not only was the $4,000.00 
used up for trip expenses for himself and Nielson, but 
some money in addition had been drawn while there 
for additional expenses (R. 331, 332). Also from this 
money, Bridwell hired a public stenographer to assist 
with their work ( R. 371). Bridwell and Nielson 
believed that they had kept complete records as to 
all of the expenses in view of the fact that these 
trip expenses were ultimately approved by l.R.S. in 
the settlement of the tax cases (R. 319, 320, 321) (Ex. 
35). 
Shortly after the return from the trip to Switzer-
land in February 1958, Nielson mailed to Wagner a 
financial statement concerning Precisa Calculating Ma-
chine Co. as of December 31, 1957 (Ex. 34A). Fol-
lowing the trip, Bridwell and Nielson continued to work 
on these cases and Bridwell filed a Petition in the Tax 
Com·t which was tentatively set for trial in the Fall 
Term of 1959. The Government made a motion to 
continue the case and it was. 
During this period of time Bridwell contacted 
~ 'V ashington attorney at his own expense for assistance 
in Washington (R. 354). Ultimately, the Tax Court 
convened in Salt Lake City and Bridwell appeared and 
argued against the Government's motion for a continu-
ance. He also explored the possibilitites of obtaining 
depositions and copies of records in Paris or Swit-
zerland ( R. 354) . 
9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bridwell also conferred from time to time with a 
lawyer from the Regional Counsel's office in San 
Francisco. 
In the meantime, because of lack of funds in the 
corporate bank account, the corporation was unable to 
continue making its monthly payments on the building 
and the contract went into def a ult in June 1958 (Ex. 
24). As a result, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of the 
owners of the building for the purpose of cancelling the 
contract. Bridwell prevailed upon counsel for the Plain-
tiffs in that case, Mr. Bernstein, to grant to Precisa 
an option to purchase back the building within one year. 
Prior to this time, Bridwell had made application to 
the District Director of Internal Revenue to discharge 
the Oren Romney property from the tax lien so that 
the Romneys could pay the balance off to Precisa Cal-
culating Machine Co. and expressly stated in said Peti-
tion, that this was necessary so that Precisa could con-
tinue making the monthly payments on the property at 
375 'Vest 4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah. This peti-
tion was denied (Ex. K, R. 363). 
This option was exercised by Robert Schubach, a 
friend and client of Bridwell, who to September 1961, 
had put his own money into the building to the extent 
of $11,370.30. In order to satisfy the Internal Revenue 
that this was a bona fide transaction and not a sham, 
Bridwell had to obtain an affidavit from Schubach to 
this effect (Ex. J) . 
IO 
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At the time of Bridwell' s second trip to Switzerland 
in the first part of September 1961, during his conver-
sations with Wagner, he informed Wagner pursuant to 
what Schubach had told him prior to the trip, that at 
that time Schubach was willing to merely receive his 
investment back together with interest. During the con-
versation, Bridwell gave Wagner a complete break-
down as: 
"Initial Payment --------------------------------$ 7,277.10 
1960 Taxes ------------------------------------------ 873.55 
Keys ------------------···-···---·-········-···-···-····· 5.64 
Insurance ------···---------······-------------------- 214.08 
September 1960 to July 1961 
at $250.00/month -----------·-··----------------- 2,750.00 
August 1961 ·----------------------·---------------- 250.00 
TOT AL --------------------------------- -------------$11,370.30" 
As of that time, neither Wagner nor any of the 
principals of Precisa were willing to take Schubach up 
on this offer. However, as will be discussed later, there 
was language in the corporate minutes to the effect that 
the company urged Schubach to give it, Jost or ':V agner 
the right to purchase the property back at the market 
price ( R. 368) . 
During the summer of 1961, Bridwell determined 
that it was essential for him to travel to Switzerland 
again for the purpose of getting the voluminous aff i-
davit signed or that failing, at least some sort of a state-
ment from the Company to substantiate the financial 
transactions and the loss of the building in order to 
11 
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solidify the settlements then agreed and the 1957 settle-
ment which was still pending. 
The three cases in the Tax Court were settled as 
follows: 
Case No. 72273, May 29, 1961 
Case No. 72274, May 26, 1961 
Case No. 73521, May 26, 1961 (R. 435) 
However, these settlements did not cover the assess-
ments for 1957. The settlement notices for the 1957 
settlement were mailed on October 9, 1961 (R. 436). 
Bridwell corresponded with Wagner both by letter 
and by telegram and urged Wagner to send him $2,000 
for expenses for the trip to Switzerland which Bridwell 
felt was essential for the final settlement and termina-
tion of the tax matters. Bridwell explained his reasons 
as follows (R. 360, 361): 
"A. Oh, in my own mind I determined that 
it was necessary for protection of everybody 
concerned that we get this thing finalized, as I 
say, because I'd started having some indications 
that I'd probably be successful in getting these 
things resolved without going to the Tax Court 
in this last case, these last two cases. 
Q. They were about at the stage where you 
felt they could be -
A. Yeah. \\Tell, my- my conversations with 
these varied people in the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, I was pretty confident we could get them 
settled. The precise amounts were still disputed, 
12 
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but - also the items that they disallowed. Now, 
I thought I could resolve it provided we had 
something to back it up that couldn't subse-
quently be upset in the - the later cases as well 
as the ones that had been settled in the Tax 
Court couldn't be upset upon the basis of mis-
representations. 
Q. Did you feel that there was any jeopardy 
of the settlements that had already been made 
being upset? 
A. Well, Mr. Black, I have to go back in 
point of time now and I hope I can make myself 
clear on this. You've got to re-orient yourself. 
The circumstances that existed at the time W3re 
this was a mysterious fraud case and you just 
never knew. As I said in the beginning, I had 
an idea there was an informant. I was never 
able to substantiate it. I wanted things tied up 
for the benefit of Mr. Wagner, people at the 
factory and myself." 
Bridwell arrived in Switzerland and immediately 
turned over the accountings and settlements to 'V' agner 
( Exs. 33, 35). At a later date, after Wagner had been 
able to go through the accountings and study them, 
\V agner and Bridwell had what was described by both 
as a heated discussion at Bridwell's hotel room. 'Vagner 
testifying from his notes concerning the dates, having 
reconstructed same from his diary, stated that the con-
versation which lasted some seven hours took place on 
September 6, 1961 (R. 66). At this heated discussion, 
\V agner made various accusations and the entire series 
of events was discussed, and Bridwell brought Wagner 
13 
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completely up-to-date on the building transaction. Even-
tually, the two of them made their peace and Bridwell 
prepared in his own handwriting corporate minutes to 
be submitted to the corporation and a general power 
of attorney. Wagner then typed u_p the minutes and 
power of attorney for presentation to the Board of Di-
rectors. Wagner not only typed these documents but 
also hired a local lawyer, Dr. Alfred Weierz, to help 
explain to the members of the Board why it was advis-
able to sign them (R. 83, 84) (Exs. 18, ISA, 19, 19A, 
19B). 
Exhibit 19A is the original _signed minutes of the 
Stockholders' Meeting at Zurich, Switzerland on Sep-
tember 8, 1961, and Exhibit 19B is a copy of the power 
of attorney which was signed and executed at the same 
meeting. 
A study of the minutes of this meeting reveals a 
full and complete disclosure of all that Bridwell had 
done in these cases concerning payment of fees and costs 
to himself and Nielson and the building transaction 
with Schubach, and contains a complete ratification by 
Precisa A.G., Ernst Jost and Eugene Wagner. In 
addition, Precisa A.G., Jost and Wagner signed the 
general power of attorney giving Bridwell power 
to wind up the tax cases. The general power of 
attorney further contained language ratifying and 
confirming everything that Bridwell had done to date 
and shall do by virtue of these presents. 
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The minutes specifically ratified and consented to 
all travel expenses, accounting fees and legal fees, as 
reflected by the accountings prepared by Frank Niel-
son and approved of the $2,000 which Wagner had 
sent to Bridwell prior to his trip to Switzerland. The 
minutes further stated: 
"It is understood there are further substantial 
fees, validly and avowedly due as a corporate 
obligation for legal and accounting services ren-
dered and to be rendered, to George E. Bridwell 
and Franl-c Nielson, and George E. Bridwell 
shall be and he hereby is authorized to make 
and authorize such corporate obligation and pay-
ment therefor as he may deem fit, in accord here-
with and in accord with the General Power of 
Attorney to be given him as is hereinafter set 
forth in this Resolution." 
In addition, the minutes outlined the details as to 
the loss of the building and stated that the contract 
with ]\fr. and Mrs. Hines went delinquent and that the 
corporation had no funds to pay thereon, and further, 
that requests for loans of the corporation to save the 
contract were unfulfilled and none of us were willing 
to risk further investment and money in the Company 
at that time because of the large outstanding tax assess-
ment and uncertainty as to outcome. Furthermore, it 
was stated in regard to the building that at the time 
set to exercise the option the Company had no money 
and none of us would have loaned money to exercise 
it. And that under possessed authority counsel exercised 
the option for the Company, then for the Company 
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he conveyed the right to Robert M. Schubach which 
we ratify; "It didn't harm us as we had no funds avail-
able." The minutes further stated that Schubach is a 
close friend of Bridwell and that Bridwell is his attor-
ney and that they commended Schubach for his courage 
in advancing such sums at great risk. The minutes 
further acknowledged that the building is and would 
be lost to the Company and that the Company acknowl-
edges it and affirms it. In addition, the minutes re-
quested counsel to ask Schubach to give the Company, 
Jost or Wagner first right of refusal to purchase or 
lease the building at the same terms as any bona fide 
off er he may receive and desires to take. 
After returning from the trip to Switzerland, 
Bridwell completed the settlement of the tax cases and 
notified Wagner that he could return to this country 
without fear of prosecution. (Ex. 17 Letter Bridwell 
to 'Vagner, dated October 27, 1961} 
Prior to the trip in September 1961, on May 19, 
1961, Bridwell wrote a letter to Wagner informing 
him in detail as to what had happened to the building 
and of the fact that Schubach at that time would be 
willing to get his money back together with a profit 
for the risk he had undertaken. Bridwell in the same 
letter asked Wagner to find out what Jost and Precisa 
A.G. would desire to do with the building. (Ex. 5) 
After the final settlement of the cases on Octo her 
9, 1961, Bridwell received a refund from the Govern-
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ment in the amount of $15,520. 70 which he disbursed 
as follows: 
Property Taxes for Eugene 
_Wagner property --------------------------------$1,392.34 
N 1elson, Psarras and Nilson, C.P .A.s__$6, 700.00 
George E. Bridwell, balance 
of attorney fee -----------··--·-··--·······-···----$7,428.36 
Bridwell testified that he informed Wagner orally 
of the disbursal of this refund shortly after Wagner 
came back ( R. 376) . 
After returning, Wagner, through a process of 
negotiation with Schubach, purchased the building from 
Schubach for the total sum of $35,000.00. Wagner 
paid Schubach cash except for a promissory note of 
$2,657.19, dated December 11, 1961 (Ex. 23). Schu-
bach made a profit of better than $10,000.00 on this 
transaction. Bridwell received nothing from this trans-
action ( R. 379) . 
Schubach supported Bridwell' s testimony that he 
had at a prior time offered the property back to Wagner 
for what he had invested plus some interest (R. 145). 
Schubach further testified that Bridwell made nothing 
from the property transaction ( R. 125) . 
In support of the blanket charge made by Wagner 
that Bridwell had failed to account for monies collected 
by Dunn & Bradstreet for Presica and Otto Bock, 
Wagner went to Dunn & Bradstreet on November 20, 
1961 and examined their records concerning collections 
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made for Precisa. Although he was ready to accuse 
Bridwell of failing to account for large sums he came 
up with three checks which were deposited in Brid-
well's account. One dated 12-16-58 for $225.50, one 
dated 7-21-59 for $79.00 and one dated 8-7-59 for 
$78.44, totalling $382.94. Bridwell had no memory 
of these checks when he was confronted with them for 
the first time at the hearing of this matter. 'Vagner, 
instead of taking the checks and confronting Bridwell 
with them at the time he discovered them, withheld the 
checks for use in the hearing. 
Bridwell's contention is that had he been con-
fronted with these checks while his memory was clear, 
that he would have had a satisfactory explanation. 
His contention further is that there must have been a 
satisfactory explanation because Bridwell does not steal 
money from clients. 
Further, Bridwell testified that there were many 
items which have never been accounted with Wagner 
concerning money which Bridwell advanced and was 
never repaid. Bridwell testified that he loaned $650 
to Wagner's ex-wife, Nellie, for which he had never 
been repaid, and further, that he had expended sums 
of money for telephone calls and cablegrams, not only 
on this matter but in regard to the Otto Bock fran-
chise. He made many telephone calls to an attorney 
in Minneapolis concerning the Otto Bock franchise for 
which he had never been repaid (R. 382). Further, 
he hired an attorney in Washington, D.C. to make an 
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appearance for which he had never been repaid (R. 381, 
382, 404). Also, Bridwell paid with his own money, 
a wage claim with the Industrial Commission for an 
employee by the name of Richard Lieber of $60 to $70 
which was not repaid (R. 406, 407). 
'Vagner admitted that he never confronted Brid-
well with these checks and that he saved them for the 
hearing in the Bar matter. It may be noted that Wagner 
had ~he checks for almost a year before he made his com-
plaint to the Bar (R. 249). 
It may also be noted that Wagner accused Bridwell 
of selling a calculating machine and pocketing the 
money which on further investigation turned out to be 
a false charge and was accordingly dropped ( R. 250) . 
As far as the charge that Bridwell had converted 
money loaned to Metroplitan Finance is concerned, 
YVagner's own accounting attached to Exhibit 4 shows 
a sum of $300 paid which was apparently interest paid 
by .Metropolitan Finance Co. on the loan. This money 
is entirely accounted for with the $4,000 check which 
Bridwell cashed at American Express Co. for travel 
expenses for the first trip to Switzerland (Ex. C) (R. 
140). 
'Vagner charged Bridwell with representing con-
flicting interests in regard to Bridwell' s purchase of 
n chandelier at the auction which the Government held 
on the property of 'V agner and Precisa. Wagner 
offered no evidence of any kind concerning communica-
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tion with Bridwell prior to the auction and his letters 
contained no mention whatsoever of the chandelier 
although there was mention made of some books called 
The Journal of Discourses. Wagner accuses Bridwell 
of some type of misconduct in purchasing this chande-
lier. Bridwell's testimony stands undisputed to the effect 
that his only function in this regard benefitted Wagner. 
Bridwell testified that at the auction he was informed 
that a man from Salt Lake Light & Fixture Co. had 
approached Mr. Doxie who was handling the auction 
and had indicated that he would probably be willing 
to pay a good price but needed more time to check with 
his company. Mr. Doxie approached Bridwell and 
asked if a continuance as to this item was agreeable 
with him. Bridwell agreed. At that time, Doxie an-
nounced to everyone present that the auction on the 
chandelier would be held the following day or possibly 
at a date more than one day later. At the time set 
for the resumption of the auction, the lighting fixture 
man informed Doxie that the sale did not materialize 
and the auction was carried on. A lady from the Utah 
Historical Society bid a high of $145.00 and Bridwell 
bid $150.00 for the high bid. Accordingly, Bridwell 
received the chandelier, paying for it with his own 
funds, and later gave it to a friend (R. 388, 389). This 
was the only evidence as to this charge. 
The only evidence concerning the charge of using 
company bricks in constructing a bar came from recross-
examination by the Bar Prosecutor. Bridwell testified 
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that he had rented the building to one Joe Looser aml 
that Looser did not pay the rental. Looser volunteered 
to do some work and Bridwell accepted work done by 
him in constructing a bar in his basement with some 
used company brick. Bridwell testified that in addition 
to the amount owed to the Company he also paid Looser 
$200 or $300. Bridwell has at all times been willing 
to account to the Company for this but an accounting 
was made rather difficult in the face of outright charge3 
of embezzlement made by Wagner ( R. 408, 409) . 
After the building transaction had been completed, 
\Vagner came to Bridwell's office and made accusa-
tions of embezzlement. Bridwell told him to get out. 
This was the last time that Bridwell saw Wagner. 
This conversation occurred shortly after the building 
transaction was completed on December 11, 1961 (R. 
383, 384). After this, Bridwell corresponded with 
Mr. F. Bieler, one of the principals of the Precisa A.G. 
parent corporation, and in reply, received a letter from 
Mr. Bieler dated March 7, 1962. This letter stated in 
part as follows: 
"I was rather surprised about the differences 
between you and Mr. Wagner. Unfortunately, 
Mr. Ernst Jost is still away. 
I have had the pleasure of meeting you several 
times here in Zurich, and during our discussions 
I got the best impression of yourself and I es-
teemed very much your frank way of dealing 
matters. Now I would like to submit you a per-
sonal question. Mr. Wagner wants Mr. Jost to 
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give him full power regarding all the shares made 
out to .Mr. Jost and to Precisa Ltd. Would you 
be interested in getting full power from Mr. Jost 
with re9·ard to the shares in question? .Mr. Jost 
hein~ no~ i~1formed about this letter, I should ap-
preciate It If you would kindly address to me some 
personal lines by letting me know your viewpoint 
in this matter. 
Looking forward to hearing from you at your 
convenience, l remain mcamvbile with best per-
sonal regards." 
It can be seen from the above letter that Wagner's 
'testimony indicating that the Precisa people were 
unhappy with Bridwell has no foundation. The pleasant, 
friendly relationship which Bridwell had with these 
peopk is conclusively shown by the above letter where 
Bieler is offering to help Bridwell by obtaining a proxy 
from Mr. Jost as to his shares. 
At the time of oral argument on this matter the 
Bar Prosecutor admitted that the Bar had failed to 
produce evidence supporting Paragraph III ( e) of the 
Complaint, inasmuch as the Bar had failed to prove that 
there were funds then available at the time that the 
contract for the purchase of the property at 375 'Vest 
4th South came into default. The prosecutor then 
moved to amend the Complaint to conform to the 
evidence so as to charge Bridwell with a conflict of 
interest in regard to the building transaction. We ob-
jected to this amendment in view of the fact that 
Wagner's complaint had been on file for six years. 
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The Hearing Committee denied the objection and al-
lowed the amendment. 
After hearing and argument and after Bridwell 
had submitted a memorandum of authorities in support 
of the legal contentions made both in his motion to 
dismiss and in argument after hearing, the Disciplinary 
Committee made Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law sustaining the allegations of the complaint made 
in Paragraph III, sub-paragraphs (a), (b), ( c), ( e) 
as amended, (g) and (h), and concluded that Bridwell 
had violated the Rules of the Utah State Bar govern-
ing professional conduct ( R. 17). 
The Board of Commissioners of the Utah State 
Bar approved the Findings and Conclusions and has 
recommended an Order by the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah disbarring George E. Bridwell from 
the practice of law. 
Bridwell filed an answer to the complaint on April 
14, 1967 (R. 4). In said answer, Bridwell prayed for 
an immediate hearing on the charges. On July 14, 1967, 
Bridwell filed a motion to dismiss the charges for the 
rc[lson that he had been denied an immediate hearing 
and the Committee had been unable to provide such 
(R. 6). 
An Order fixing time and place for hearing was 
issued on May 27, 1968 setting hearing on the matter 
at 9 :00 A.M. on September 9, 1968. At that time, 
Bridwell filed an Affidavit in support of the Motion 
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to Dismiss and counsel for the Bar filed an Affidavit 
in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and said Motion 
was argued before the Disciplinary Committee and 
denied. Hearing was then held on October 10 and 
October 11, 1968, and oral arguments were held on 
October 23, 1968. The Findings and Conclusions were 
rendered by the Hearing Committee on February 17, 
1969. 
The affidavit filed by Bridwell in support of the 
motion to dismiss revealed the following as the time 
schedule of events in this matter: 
1. The facts in this case occurred between the 11'all 
of 1957 and the Fall of 1961. 
2. Wagner filed his letter of complaint to the Bar 
on October 1, 1962. 
3. On May 6, 1963, H. Wayne Wadsworth, ap-
pointed as investigator by the Bar, asked Bridwell for 
a written explanation. 
4. On May 16, 1963, Bridwell responded to the 
charges with an eight page letter. 
5. On August 2, 1963, ,;v adsworth wrote to Brid-
well for further clarification. 
6. On October 1, 1963, Bridwell submitted a 
further letter of clarification. 
7. On January 31, 1966, the Board of Commis-
sioners of the Utah State Bar ordered that a complaint 
be filed against affiant. 
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8. On April 15, 1966, Bridwell received a letter 
from Clifford L. Ashton, Prosecutor, enclosing a copy 
of the complaint and stating in part: 
"I have not filed any copy with the Bar Com-
mission and intend at the present to keep the 
matter strictly confidential." 
9. On July 5, 1966, Mr. Ashton, by letter, informed 
Bridwell that he was no longer prosecuting and in-
formed him that 'the case was now on file. 
10. Bridwell filed his Answer on April 13, 1967 
requesting an immediate hearing. 
11. In the Affidavit filed by Marvin J. Bertoch, 
it appeared that the complaining witness, Eugene 
Wagner, returned to Switzerland in early 1966 and 
remained until January 1968, and that counsel for the 
Bar could not arrange a hearing in January of 1968. 
We were not notified of this. 
12. It appears from the affidavit of Bridwell, that 
,;v agner was out of the country during the time men-
tioned in Mr. Bertoch's affidavit for the reason that 
he was under Federal Charge. He apparently resolved 
this matter by January 1968. 
From the aforesaid 'time schedule as to the events 
that occurred in this case, we have the following con-
clusions. 
1. From October 1, 1962, the date of the letter 
of complaint, to January 31, 1966, the date that com-
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plaint was ordered by the Bar, we have a lapse of time 
of three years and four months. 
2. :From January 31, 1966, the date when the com-
plaint was ordered, to April 15, 1966, the date that the 
Bar complaint was filed, there is a lapse of two and one-
half months. 
3. From April 15, 1966, the date that formal com-
plaint was filed, to September 9, 1968, the date of hear-
ing, there is a lapse of time of two years, four months 
and twenty-four days. 
4. From the date of April 13, 1967, the date when 
formal demand for an immediate hearing was made, 
to September 9, 1968, the date of hearing, there is a 
lapse of time in the amount of one year, four months 
and twenty-four days. 
5. From the date of \7\Tagner's letter of complaint, 
October 1, 1962, to the hearing date, September 9, 
1968, there is a lapse of time of slightly less than 
six years. 
In support of the credibility of George Bridwell 
as a witness, affidavits were submitted from six of the 
seven Judges of the Third Judicial District Court 
attesting to Bridwell's good reputation for truth and 
veracity from more than 15 years' acquaintance. 
In addition to this, similar testimony attesting to 
Bridwell's good reputation in the community for truth 
and veracity was elicited from Sam Bernstein ( R. 341 ) 
and Sumner Hatch (R. 350). 
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As far as Wagner was concerned, Hatch testified 
that he had represented Wagner, and, there being no 
objection as to the privilege, the Committee allowed 
Hatch to testify as to Wagner's reputation for truth 
and veracity in the community which he testified was 
poor (R. 349). 
l n addition to this, 'i\T agner had also threatened 
to make a complaint to the bar on Hatch which Hatch 
immediately forwarded to the bar, this resulting from 
a collection matter which Hatch had handled for 
'" agner ( R. 260). Wagner also accused his ex-wife, 
Nellie 'i\Tagner, of embezzling money (R. 259). Wag-
ner accused the agents from the I.R.S. who interviewed 
him of being dishonest (R. 220). Wagner also com-
plained that the Government was blackmailing him 
(R. 324). 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In presenting the argument on the facts and the 
law in this case, we urge the Court to review the facts 
in the light of the law concerning the burden of proof 
which the bar has. The charges should be "clearly 
sustained by convincing proof." See In re McCull01igh 
(1939) 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13; In re Hanson (1916) 
48 Utah 163, 158 P. 778; and In re Evans and Rogers, 
22 Utah 366, 62 P. 913, where the Court stated: 
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"The summary proceeding of disbarment is 
civil, and not criminal. In that proceeding, how-
ever, more than a preponderance of the evidence 
is required. The guilt of the attorney must be 
thoroughly cstµblished." 
In the case of In re Reily ( 1919) 75 Okl. 192, 183 P. 
728, the Court stated at p. 730: 
"The serious consequences of disbarment 
should follow only where there is a clear prepon-
derance of the evidence against the respondent. 
In such proceeding the attorney sought to be 
disbarred is presumed to be innocent of the 
charges preferred, and to have performed his 
duty as an officer of the Court in accordance 
with his oath, and the evidence in support of 
the charges must satisfy the court to a reasonable 
certainty that the charges are true and warrant 
a judgment of disbarment." 
The Court further stated: 
"The law does not demand that every technical 
infraction of the law by an attorney shall require 
his disbarment, although an attorney should en-
deavor to observe literally the law; but it is those 
infractions of duty by an attorney that involve 
moral turpitude and evince a depraved character, 
rendering such attorney untrustworthy and a 
reflection upon the bar and the Court, as an 
officer thereof, that demand his disbarment." 
In the case of Browne v. State Bar of California 
(1955) 45 Cal.2d 165, 287 P.2d 745, the Court held that 
in a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney any 
reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the attar-
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ney; citing Golden v. State Bar, 213 Cal. 237, 2 P.2d 
325, and also quoting from Hildebrand v. Stµte Bar, 18 
Cal.2d 816, 117 P.2d 860: 
"In proceedings of this character where the 
evidence is conflicting, as is shown to be the fact 
herein, the findings of the local administrative 
committee and of the Board of Bar Governors 
are not necessarily binding on this Court." 
In considering whether or not the Bar has sustained 
its burden of proof as outlined above, we wish to remind 
the Court that George E. Bridwell has been a lawyer 
in good standing in the State of Utah since the year 
1949. We are sure that the Court is aware of the serious 
nature of these proceedings and the drastic results that 
the findings of the Board of Commissioners has inflicted 
on the life and career of George E. Bridwell. 
'Ve submit, as will be pointed out in the argument, 
that the prosecution has not even come close to sustain-
ing its burden of proof, and that many of the charges 
are petty, nit-picking charges resulting from a shotgun 
a pp roach by the complaining witness. 
POINT I. THE UNCONSCIONABLE DE-
LAY FROM ORIGINAL COMPLAINT BY 
'VAGNER TO HEARING REQUIRES DIS-
MISSAL OF ALL CHARGES. 
(A) BRIDWELL WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RI G H T TO A 
SPEEDY TRIAL. 
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The file in this case shows that there was a lapse of 
t}iree years and four months from initial complaint by 
Wagner to the date when a complaint was ordered 
by the Bar Corrunission. The file shows that there was 
less than one month short of six years from initial com-
plaint to the hearing on this matter. The evidence at 
the hearing in this matter involved intricate transac-
tions, records, letters and conversations which occurred 
from the Fall of 1957 to the Fall of 1961. The facts 
in this case were from seven to eleven years old at the 
time of the hearing. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has 
recently held that lawyers are entitled to the same 
Fourteenth Amendment rights as any other person. 
The Supreme Court has specifically held that speedy 
trial is a Constituional right included in the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
The case of Spevack v. Klein (1967) 385 U.S. 511, 
87 S.Ct. 625, held that lawyers in disbarment proceed-
ings were entitled to Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
In that case the basis for disbarment involved the 
refusal of the attorney to produce demanded financial 
records and to testify at the judicial inquiry on the basis 
that the production of records and testimony would 
tend to incriminate him. The Court held that the Fifth 1 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination ap-
plies to lawyers in state disbarment proceedings pur- i 
suant to the Fourteenth Amendmen't which incorpo- 1 
rates the Fifth Amendment. The Court stated in part 
as follows: 
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"* * * lawyers also enJoy first class citizen-
ship." 
and again at p. 627: 
"We conclude that Cohen v. Hurley should 
be overruled, that the Self-Incrimination Clause 
of the :Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in 
the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to 
lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that 
it. should not be watered down by imposing the 
dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a 
livelihood as a price for asserting it." 
Also, see In re Ruffalo (1968) 390 U.S. 544, 88 
S.Ct. 1222, and In re Schlesi,nger (1961) 404 Pa. 
584, 172 A.2d 835, where it was stated: 
"The right to practice law is Constitutionally 
protected as a property right and no attorney 
can lawfully be deprived of such right except 
by clue process of law and upon competent and 
relevent proofs sufficiently credible to support 
a just order of disbarment." 
In the case of Klopfer v. State of North Carolina 
(1967) 386 U.S. 213, 87 St.Ct. 988, the Supreme Court 
of the United States held that the right to a speedy 
trial is guaranteed to defendants in state courts pur-
suant to the Sixth Amendment which is held to be 
included within the Fourteenth Amendment protec-
tions. The Court stated in par't at p. 993: 
"\Ve hold here that the right to a speedy trial 
is as fundainental as any of the rights secured 
by the Sixth Amendment. That right has its 
roots at the very foundation of our English law 
heritage." 
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There can be no question if the Court holds that 
Bridwell in this proceeding was entitled, the same as 
any person under criminal charge, to a speedy trial, 
that that right was violated in this case. Six years from 
original complaint by complaining witness to hearing 
must surely violate the right to a speedy trial. 'Ve can 
further point out that as soon as Bridwell's answer was 
filed in this matter on April 13, 1967, we specifically 
demanded an immediate hearing and were not given 
one for one year, four months and 24 days. There can 
be no question that Bridwell was greatly prejudiced 
by this unconscionable delay. 
It is obvious that the facts were six years older at 
the time of hearing than they were at the time of 
complaint. Throughout the record when specifics were 
asked Bridwell concerning the existence or absence of 
letters, Bridwell had to answer many times that he 
remembered some letters but could not find all of his 
files. He went through two changes of law partnership 
during this time. Mr. Doxie, who conducted the auc-
tion, is deceased. The three checks which Wagner 
obtained from Dunn & Bradstreet and withheld to the 
time of hearing, were shown to Bridwell for the very 
first time at the hearing, approximately seven years 
after Wagner had first obtained them. They were nearly 
ten years old at the time of the hearing. 
The entire responsibility for providing a speedy 
trial to an accused lawyer rests on the shoulders of the 
Bar Commission. This responsibility cannot be avoided 
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or delegated. Bridwell has no duty with respect to it. 
As stated at 21 Am.Jur.2d 279: 
"No court has any discretionary power to deny 
an accused person a right so important. Both 
the court and the prosecution are under a posi-
tive duty to prevent unreasonable delay, and the 
granting of a speedy trial is not a matter to be 
determined by the trial judge in the exercise 
of an uncontrolled personal discretion." 
Further speaking of the basis for this right, it is further 
stated at 21 Am.Jur.2d 279: 
"* * * it relieves him of the anxiety and public 
suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation 
of crime; and, like statutes of limitation, it pre-
vents him from being exposed to the hazard of 
a trial after the lapse of so great a time that the 
means of proving his innocence may have been 
lost." 
Although it is obvious that Bridwell has been greatly 
prejudiced by being deprived of a speedy trial, we 
contend that when a person is deprived of a funda-
mental constitutional right, prejudice is presumed. 
On this basis alone all charges should be dismissed. 
(B) THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES DE-
MANDS DISMISSAL. 
Courts have accepted the doctrine of laches as 
applicable to disciplinary proceedings against an attor-
ney (see 7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, Paragraph 
62) . The reason for applying the doctrine of laches 
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are the same as those involved in giving an attorney the 
constitutional right to a speedy trial. An attorney is 
greatly prejudiced in his ability to defend because of 
the loss of records and other evidence, and the stale-
ness of the evidence cannot help but prejudice an 
attorney called to answer charges. This is especially 
true where we have an unscrupulous complaining wit-
ness preparing and constructing the evidence in minute 
detail as appears here. 
The Utah Supreme Court has at least recognized 
that the doctrine of !aches may be applicable in a disci-
plinary proceedings. See In re Steffensen (1938) 9~ 
Utah 436, 78 P.2d 531. 
In the instant case, because of the intricacy of the 
transactions associated with the charges, their com-
plexity and the loss of records and evidence, the concept 
of laches is readily applicable. 
Cases from other jurisdictions based on similar 
contentions lend support to the conclusion that the 
doctrine should be recognized by the Court in this case. 
Proceedings instituted a long time after the commission 
of an alleged act of misconduct by an attorney "are 
regarded with disfavor." The Court in State v. Hag-
gerty (1942) 241 Wisc. 486, 6 N.W.2d 203, stated in 
part as fallows: 
" 'However, proceedings instituted after a 
great lapse of time from the commission of the 
act complained of are regarded with disfavor, 
and the Court may refuse to hear an application 
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to disbar that has been unreasonably delayed.' 
5 Am.Jur. p. 434, par. 288; see also 2 Thornton 
on Attorneys at Law, Sec. 880." 
The court in Columbus Bar Association v. Teaford 
( 1966) 6 Ohio St.2d 253, 35 Ohio Opin.2d 318, 117 
N.E.2d 872, recognized the reason for not favoring old 
claims, stating: 
"Records may be destroyed an;l recollections 
may be hazy. It is for this reason that the prose-
cution of old claims is not favored. See 7 Am. 
J ur.2d 86, Attorneys at Law, Sec. 62." 
The case of Murrell v. Florida Bar (Fla. 1960) 
122 So.2d 169, dismissed a disciplinary action against 
an attorney where the investigation had been pending 
for five years. This is a shorter period of time than is 
involved at the case at bar. The court stated: 
" ( 1) We are confronted here with a disci-
plinary proceeding that has been under investi-
gation for five years or longer. The disciplinary 
rule requires that all investigations and hearings 
of disciplinary cases shall be begun, prosecuted, 
and completed as promptly as the ends of justice 
will permit. 'All investigations and hearings shall 
be informal but thorough, with the object of 
ascertaining the truth.' This is a most essential 
requirement, the reason being that the minute 
such a proceeding is instituted the lawyer's pro-
fessional reputation is shadowed and in danger 
of being permanently impaired. Such charges 
should not be suspended in limbo. They should 
be dispatched and if found to be without merit, 
the lawyer charged should be exonerated. * * * * 
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( 2) This record, partly narrated in this opin-
ion, convinces every member of this Court that 
these proceedings have gone far enough. To 
continue would amount to no more than harass-
ment and would constitute an abuse of the powers 
given this Court and its commissions under Sec-
tion 23 of Article V of the Constitution, F.S.A." 
Also see In re Ratner (1965) 194 Kan. 362, 399 P.2d 
865; and The Jllorida Bar v. King (Fla. 1965) 174 So. 
2d 398. The Court in the King case made some obser-
vations which appear to be pertinent in the case at bar 
as follows: 
~ 
I 
"We are now confronted with the question of 
whether or not we should further damage re-
spondent by taking away from him his profession 
of thirty-nine years' standing. He has suffered 
degradation and humiliation, the loss of re-elec-
tion to the senate, as well as the presidency of 
1 
the senate, the loss of $10,000.00 and the torment 
of being under criminal prosecution for a num-
ber of years. In spite of this, according to all 
of the evidence presented, he has at all times 
since that episode nine years ago conducted him-
self in an exemplary manner as a man and as !, 
a lawyer. The testimony reflects that since this 
occasion, he has given his clients 'gold-plated' 
service in his legal representation of them. He i 
has the support of every circuit judge of his cir- , 
cuit, as well as the bar of that area. In addition, 1• 
other prominent and substantial non-lawyer citi-
zens appeared in his behalf. 
( 3) In spite of the respondent's gross miscon-
duct of nine years ago, we believe that by his 
subsequent exemplary conduct he has earned the 1 
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right to continue to serve his profession. We 
believe that he will at all times in the future 
~onduct himself in such manner as to rectify, 
msofar as he can, the blemish that he has placed 
upon his record. If we did not think so, we would 
agree with the Board of Governors and sustain 
the order of disbarment. Under the circum-
stances heretofore related, however, we consider 
disbarment or suspension at this late date to be 
excessive." 
The above Courts have recognized that uncon-
scionable delay in invoking disciplinary proceedings 
warrants dismissal of the proceeding. The proceedings 
are not intended to punish the attorney but merely to 
insure that the public will be provided with the quality 
of legal service the Bar has traditionally provided. We 
think that Bridwell has been punished enough by hav-
ing these proceedings hanging over his head for seven 
years. Bridwell has the support of lawyers and judges 
in this area and has at all times, before, during and 
since his period of representing Wagner, conducted 
himself in an exemplary manner. This must not be lost 
sight of. 
(C) THIS PROCEEDING VIOLATES THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The last incident mentioned in the testimony con-
cerning conduct of Bridwell from which charges were 
made occurred in December of 1961 when Bridwell 
prepared the promissory note. The complaint was filed 
against Bridwell by the Bar on ApriJ 15, 1966, more 
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than four years later. We contend that the complaint 
violates the Statute of Limitations having to do with 
1 
"special proceedings." Section 78-12-25 U.C.A. 1953, 
sub-par. 2 provides for a four year Statute of Limita-
tions where an action (special proceedings) is not other- ' 
wise specifically provided for in the article. Section 
78-12-33 U.C.A. 1953, provides that the Statute of 
Limitations prescribed in the Judicial Code is applicable 
in instances where the action is brought in the name 
of or "for the benefit of the state." The Utah State 
Bar Association is an integrated bar and is an arm 
of the State of Utah. Actions brought by it are there-
fore actions for the benefit of the State. Section 78-12-
.J.6 U.C.A. 1953, provides " 'action' includes special , 
proceeding. - The word 'action', as used in this chap- 1 
ter, is to be construed, whenever it is necessary to do 
so, as including a special proceeding of a civil nature." 
In Crystal Car Line v. State 1'ax Commission, 
no Utah 426, 174 P.2d 984, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that a special proceeding under the quoted 
section applied to proceedings of quasi-judicial bodies 
where the rights of parties are determined, including 
those actions which were unknown at common law. 
Disciplinary proceedings are special proceedings. In re 
Stice, 184 Kan. 589, 339 P.2d 29; In re Burnette (1906) 
73 Kan. 609, 95 P. 575; In re Sherman (Wash.) 363 
P.2d 390; and Spriggs v. The Bar, 61 Wyo. 70, 155 
P.2d 285. 
In Brotsky v. State Bar of California (1962) 57 
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Cal.2d 287, 368 P.2d 697, the California Supreme Court 
ruled that provisions and statutory principles relating 
to civil actions were applicable in disbarment proceed-
ings. The Court, although not specifically concerned 
with a Statute of Limitations problem, stated a rule 
which would require the application of a limitations 
statute in disciplinary cases. 
"Since the State bar acts as an arm of the 
court, its activity should be governed by those 
statutory principles which have been enacted as 
rules of procedure for all courts. By whatever 
name a disciplinary proceeding is called, whether 
an action or special proceeding, it is in essence 
the initial stage of an action in court." 
The instant action arises out of the statutory 
authority granted to the Utah State Bar under Section 
78-51-12 U.C.A. 1953. Consequently, the action is a 
special proceeding, civil in nature, to which normal limi-
tation provisions should apply. The policy reasons, 
precluding stale actions in civil proceedings, are equally 
as applicable to disciplinary proceedings as to other 
civil cases. Accordingly, we submit that the Statute of 
Limitations above cited requires dismissal of all charges. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE FINDINGS. 
(A) CREDIBILITY 
It is submitted that the Bar has not sustained its 
burden of proof in respect to any of the findings of 
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unprofessional conduct. This is especially true in vie·w 
of the evidence in the record reflecting on the lack of 
credibility of the complaining witness Wagner and the 
evidence in the record which supports the credibility 
of George E. Bridwell. 
Sumner Hatch testified that in his opinion Wagner's 
reputation for truth and veracity in this area is poor. 
Wagner's performance on the witness stand lent cre-
dence to Hatch's testimony. 
On the other hand there was testimony of lawyers 
and of all the District Judges in Salt Lake County, 
except one who was out of the area, that Bridwell's 
reputation for truth and veracity in this area is good. 
This basic fact cannot be overlooked in reviewing the 
evidence in this file. 
Wagner is a man of extremely meticulous habits 
in preparing and recalling facts. As a matter of fact, 
he had gone to the trouble of completely reviewing a 
diary and listing all of the dates in chronological order 
which he thought important in this matter to refresh 
his recollection while testifying. Also Wagner testi-
fied expansively as to his qualifications as a bookkeeper. 
Yet, this meticulous bookkeeper would have the Court 
believe that he did not even know that Bridwell was 
paying himself attorney fees from the Company bank 
account when the statements were sent monthly to 
the Company address in Salt Lake City and presum-
ably forwarded to Wagner. This same man would have 
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the Court believe that he had no knowledge of what 
Bridwell did with the refund from the Government 
when the matter of the refund was discussed in the 
letter of October 12, 1961, when part of the refund 
was used to pay property taxes on property belonging 
to Wagner, and when Wagner, on coming back to this 
country from Switzerland, talked to Bridwell on 
numerous occasions. Bridwell testified that he told 
Wagner specifically about what was done with the 
refund and how he had paid himself, the accountant 
and 'V agner' s property taxes. Yet Wagner would have 
us believe that he never even discussed this matter with 
Bridwell during the conversations prior to the time that 
he and Bridwell had their split. 
This same meticulous man testified in great detail 
concerning his meeting with Bridwell when Bridwell 
came to Switzerland for the second time, the first 
part of September, 1961. Wagner, using his notes 
to refresh his memory, was certain that when Brid-
well first arrived he merely gave the records to Wag-
ner. Wagner then studied the records for some days 
and then, on September 6, 1961, had the "heated 
discussion" with Bridwell in Bridwell' s hotel room 
taking seven hours. He stated that after they had 
made their peace, he assisted Bridwell in typing the 
minutes and the general power of attorney. Then, 
on September 8, Wagner assisted Bridwell in con-
vincing the Board of Directors of Precisa A.G. that 
these minutes and general power of attorney should be 
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signed. Yet, in an entirely self-serving letter, written 
in the Swiss language, admitted over objection (Ex. 
21), Wagner complained to his attorney friend in 
Switzerland as to what Bridwell was doing to him and 
the Company. At the bottom of the letter he stated that 
enclosed was the power of attorney and minutew. Also, 
there was some handwriting along the border mention-
ing some further suspicions which 'V agner had of the 
reason why Bridwell needed these documents. 
The importance of this document can readily be 
seen from the fact that Wagner needed some type of 
an explanation as to why he had not only agreed to 
sign the minutes and the general power of attorney 
but actually typed them up and obtained the assistance 
of a local lawyer to help persuade the Board of Direc-
tors to sign the same. However, it appears that this 
self-serving letter v;as dat2d Sc;;/crn 1·t;· 2, 1961. No 
satisfactory explanation was given f~r this basic incon-
sistency in Wagner's testimony. It stands to reaso:1 
that 'Vagner could not have had the minutes and 
general power of attorney typed up on September 2 
when he specifically recalled, having reconstructed the 
dates from his diary, that his heated discussion was held 
with Bridwell on September 6, and that it was follow-
ing this that ~he minutes and power of attorney were 
typed. 
In addition to this, Wagner presented another 
self-serving letter (Ex. 41) which he allegedly wrote 
to Bridwell on December 25, 1961, outlining the entire 
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series of events from his point of view and expressing 
them to his own advantage. Wagner testified that this 
lengthy letter was a handwritten letter. Bridwell denied 
ever having received such a letter from Wagner and 
from all that appears in the record, every other letter 
written by Wagner was a typewrit.ten letter. Yet, the 
copy of this voluminous, handwritten letter which Wag-
ner allegedly made on December 25, 1961, was a type-
written copy. It certainly appears to us $trange that 
'V agner would go to the trouble of writing such a letter 
in his own handwriting and then type a copy of the 
letter for his own files. It is interesting to note that even 
in this self-serving letter of December 25, 1961, Wagner 
affirmed that fees to the time of the second trip to 
Switzerland had been agreed upon but that he did not 
feel that Bridwell should receive any further fees. Also, 
he expresses the desire to have Bridwell's signature on 
company checks in the future, and this at a time when 
according to Wagner, he felt that Bridwell had cheated 
him and the corporation and had engaged in all sorts 
of unprofessional conduct. 
In addition to this, Wagner testified that the 
members of the Board of Directors in Switzerland were 
reluctant to sign the minutes and inferred that they 
had the same view of Bridwell as he did. This testimony 
was rendered unreliable by Exhibit L, which was a 
letter to Bridwell from one of the Board members, Mr. 
Rieler, dated March 7, 1962, which expressed great 
trust in Bridwell and a willingness to help Bridwell 
by attempting to get him 'the power to vote the shares 
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of Mr. Jost, the majority shareholder. This letter 
paints a completely different picture of Bridwell' s rela-
tionship with the Company than Wagner would like 
the Bar to have. 
The above inconsistencies in Wagner's testimony 
plus direct evidence of unreliability as a witness, mili-
tates in favor of Bridwell and against Wagner. In 
view of this, it is utterly incomprehensible that the 
Hearing Committee in this action could have resolved 
every dispute between Bridwell and Wagner in Wag-
ner' s favor (and in one case even against the only evi-
dence in the record-chandelier incident), especially 
in view of the fact that Bridwell had independent wit-
nesses, Frank Nielson and Robert Schubach, who sup-
ported his testimony. 
(B) USING THREATS TO EXTRACT AD-
DITIONAL FEES. 
The Hearing Committee made a finding that Brid-
well used threats and coercion to extract an additional 
fee of $2,000.00 with no emergency circumstances exist-
ing. In making this finding, the Committee found 
against the evidence, logic and legal common sense. 
The true fact of the matter was that Bridwell, who 
represented Wagner and the corporation throughout 
this rather involved proceeding, felt that it was neces-
sary to make the second trip to Switzerland in order 
to complete the settlement of these cases which had 
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already been agreed upon and to settle the 1957 case 
which was still open. 
Bridwell testified that in his opinion this trip was 
necessary in order to attempt to get the voluminous 
affidavit signed or that failing, to obtain something in 
writing from the corporation to substantiate the rep-
resentations which had been made to the l.R.S. Brid-
well testified that until the matter was completely 
finished it could have been upset at any time if the 
people in I.R.S. had any doubts as to any representa-
tions which had been made. He was especially con-
cerned with the building transaction, that the l.R.S. 
may get suspicious as to whether or not the Schubach 
arrangement was legitimate and that Schubach was 
a true purchaser of the building. 
In the face of this direct testimony by Bridwell, 
we have Wagner's testimony that he knew of no reason 
why Bridwell needed to make the trip. The Hearing 
Committee resolved the dispute in favor of Wagner 
and against Bridwell in spite of the fact that Bridwell 
testified as a respected attorney and "with the presump-
tion of innocence", as to the need for this trip. 
As far as using threats and coercion is concerned, 
the telegrams and letters sent to Wagner were merely 
an attempt to impress upon Wagner the importance of 
the trip. In the course of this correspondence, Bridwell 
threatened to withdraw from the case and allow \Vagner 
to obtain other counsel. Certainly, there can be nothing 
wrong with this. We assume that any lawyer has the 
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right at any time to withdraw from a case if his client 
does not cooperate with him. We certainly have to 
stretch the imagination and warp common sense to 
arrive at any kind of a conclusion that Bridwell from 
Salt Lake City could coerce and force Wagner in 
Switzerland to do anything against his will. Wagner 
testified that he had independent legal advice in Switz-
erland and certainly the advice of the Board of Directors 
of Precisa, and for the Hearing Committee to hold 
that Bridwell could completely overwhelm and coerce 
all of these people against their will to send money for 
him to come to Switzerland is ridiculous. 
We are sure that all lawyers have had experience 
with clients who were reluctant to follow our advice. 
On many occasions a lawyer must use forceful lan-
guage in order to persuade a client to take advice which 
he knows is for the client's own best interest. Certainly, 
no one in this proceeding has made any argument 
against the success that Bridwell achieved in his rep-
resentation of Wagner and Precisa. Even Wagner 
does not quarrel with the success of settling tax liability 
in excess of $700,000 for a little over $30,000, which was 
achieved in this case. 
BridweII felt that the trip was necessary in order 
to successfully complete the tax cases. He informed 
Wagner in strong language that the trip was necessary. 
Wagner did send the $2,000 which incidentally was 
not an additional fee but was for Bridwell' s costs of 
going to Switzerland and back and living in Switzer-
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land while there. We feel that it is incomprehensible 
that anybody, judicial, quasi-judicial or otherwise, can 
find any improper conduct in regard to this charge. 
'Vagner, a man who is schooled in business and with 
much experience in bookkeeping and business matters, 
certainly did not have to send the $2,000 if he did not 
want to. Certainly, if Bridwell chose to withdraw from 
this case he had the right to do so and Wagner could 
have been perfectly free to hire new counsel. However, 
'V agner chose to stay with Bridwell, a wise decision 
in this matter, and Bridwell successfully completed the 
case. 
In addition, in the minutes which Wagner and the 
corporation signed, they all specifically ratified the 
trip and the $2,000 which was sent to Bridwell. In 
addition to this, in the self-serving letter of December 
25, 1961 (Ex. 14), Wagner stated that he agreed and 
accepted all fees and costs which had been paid to the 
date of the minutes. 
'Ve submit that this finding by the Hearing Com-
mittee is without merit, is not supported by the evidence 
in this case, and does not comport with logic and com-
mon sense. 'Ve ask again what could possibly be wrong 
or what could possibly violate the ethics of the Bar in 
regard to this charge? The charge is unfounded and 
ridiculous in the extreme. 
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(C) FAILING TO ACCOUNT FOR FUNDS 
RECEIVED. 
This charge involves the placing of three checks 
by Bridwell, received from Dunn & Bradstreet, into his 
own account. 
At the outset we wish to remind the Court that 
Bridwell was not shown these checks until the day of 
the hearing, although Wagner had these checks in his 
possession from 1961. Indeed, Wagner had these checks 
in his possession for nearly a year before he made his 
complaint to the Bar. 'Vagner did not choose to show 
these checks to Bridwell and to ask for an explanation. 
Our contentoin is that had he done so while the facts 
were fresh, Bridwell's explanation would have been 
good. 
Bridwell testified that there were many times when 
he advanced money out of his own pocket for Wagner's 
benefit. Bridwell testified that there never was a com-
plete accounting with Wagner for monies which he 
had advanced. Bridwell loaned Wagner's ex-wife, 
Nellie, the sum of $650.00 for which he was not repaid. 
He advanced sums of money for telephone calls and 
cablegrams for which he was not repaid. He hired a 
vV ashington lawyer to make an appearance in Wash-
ington for which he was not repaid. He paid a wage 
claim against Precisa for which he was not repaid. 
Yet, the Hearing Committee has found that Bridwell 
did not properly account for these monies received, m 
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spite of the fact that there was never any accounting 
made between Wagner and Bridwell for the various 
things discussed above. Certainly Wagner's secretion of 
these checks make his motives questionable to say the 
least. 
We submit that Bridwell' s explanation is good. 
'Vhy would a person of Bridwell's standing in this 
community jeopardize his entire career for such a 
pittance? This does not comport with logic, reason and 
justice. Bridwell is not a thief and he is presumed 
innocent. Indeed, it can be pointed out here that Wag-
ner in his initial complaint and in the complaint filed 
by the Har, merely made a blanket charge that Bridwell 
had failed to account for monies received from Dunn 
& Bradstreet and then, after Wagner had combed the 
files thoroughly, and had charged that Bridwell had 
received a much greater amount, came up with only 
these three checks. Wagner would have the Hearing 
Committee believe that Bridwell diverted a large 
sum of money to his own account-an unfounded and 
unproved accusation. 
The Committee completely lost sight of the fact 
that during the time of these checks Bridwell and 
'Vagner were enjoying a friendly relationship. An 
accounting most certainly would have shown that 
Bridwell was owed, not Wagner. 
Bridwell testified that as money would be received, 
he would forward it to the company office, which was 
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still in operation. Why these three checks were deposited 
in his account, he cannot remember at this time. These 
transactions happened from ten to eleven years prior 
to the hearing in this matter. Is it any wonder he cannot 
remember? 
(D) ~-tAILING TO ACCOUNT FOR TRIP 
EXPENSES. 
The Hearing Committee, in its finding as to this 
charge, has found that although Bridwell had authority 
to incur trip expenses for the first trip to Switzerland, 
when both he and Nielson went, that he thereafter 
failed to make any accounting to the client itemizing 
the expenditure of the $4,000. 
As to the money used for the first trip to Europe, 
it is admitted by the Hearing Committee that this trip 
was authorized. Certainly Wagner and the corporation 
both knew that substantial trip expenses were involved. 
In addition to this, both Wagner and the Board of 
Directors of Precisa specifically ratified the expenses 
in the corporate minutes of September 8, 1961. These 
minutes specifically reviewed the trip expenses for this 
trip. What the Hearing Committee is complaining of 
is that at this late date, Bridwell and Nielson did not 
come to the hearing with receipts showing how much 
was ~pent for every meal and for every last item dealing 
with thi5 trip. Both Bridwell and Nielson did testify 
that they are sure they did make such an accounting 
because the Federal Government in tfie settlement of 
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these tax cases accepted these trip expenses. If the 
Federal Government accepted their accounting and if 
Precisa and Wagner accepted their accounting, why 
can't the Hearing Committee accept it? 
\¥" e also point out to the Court that Bridwell was 
not charged in the complaint filed by the Bar Association 
with failing to properly account for trip expenses. The 
charge in the complaint was merely a general charge 
that he had failed to properly account for monies re-
ceived from Metropolitan Finance Company. In the 
hearing, Bridwell proved that he had properly ac-
counted for this money in view of the fact that the 
final $4,000 received from Metropolitan Finance Co. 
was used for the first trip to Switzerland. In view of 
the fact that Bridwell was not charged in the com-
plaint for failing to make a detailed accounting item-
izing all of the expenditures of the trip, the Hearing 
Committee cannot now find Bridwell guilty of a charge 
not even contained in the complaint. This is the grossest 
form of an injustice and under the same principles 
involved in the argument pertaining to the adding of 
a new charge by amendment, this is likewise a depriva-
tion of procedural due process. 
(E) FAILING TO ACCOUNT FOR RE-
FUND FROM THE GOVERNMENT. 
The Hearing Committee found that Bridwell failed 
to account for the refund of $15,520.00 until October 
20, 1962, when Nielson mailed an accounting to 
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Wagner showing that the money had been used prin-
cipally to pay Bridwell and Nielson additional fees 
plus payment of real property taxes for Wagner's 
benefit. 
Bridwell specifically referred to the fact that there 
would be a refund and that the I.R.S. people were 
interested in knowing whether any of this money re-
funded would go to Switzerland for Wagner's benefit 
or anyone else in the letter of October 12, 1961 (Ex. 
16). Bridwell further testified that as soon as Wagner 
returned to this country he informed him how the 
refund had been distributed, the attorney fee for him-
self, the fee for Nielson, and the payment of the real 
property taxes for Wagner. 
In the corporate minutes Wagner and the cor-
poration both acknowledged that further substantial 
fees were due and owing to Bridwell, and in the general 
power of attorney Bridwell was given authority to 
dispose of this refund. 
Wagner, of course, has denied that Bridwell in-
formed him of this and claims that the first knowledge 
he had of the disposition of the refund was in October 
of 1962 when he received the letter from Nielson. 
Naturally he would contend this to build up his case. 
It appears inconceivable to us that the Hearing Com-
mittee could resolve this dispute against Bridwell and 
in favor of Wagner. 
Throughout the record, it appears that Wagner 
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is a man well-schooled in business with a great deal of 
bookkeeping experience, and a man who knows where 
every penny goes. This man who knew that a refund 
would be coming would have us believe that he could 
come back to this country and have conferences with 
Bridwell about the many matters involved in the wind-
ing up of this case and complete the building trans-
action with Schubach and not once have even mentioned 
the subject of the refund and what was done with it. 
If he suspected Bridwell of witholding information, 
I assume a man of Wagner's business acuity would 
have made a direct inquiry to I.R.S. 
In addition to this, Wagner had to know that hi.s 
real property tax was paid and he certainly knew that 
he didn't pay it. So, how can Wagner at this date, come 
to this Court and urge the Court to believe him when 
he says he knew absolutely nothing as to what was 
done with his refund until he received the letter from 
Nielson? Obviously, after the open breach with Brid-
well, 'V agner' s only purpose in pressing Nielson for 
this letter was so that he could come in at a later date 
and complain that Bridwell had not accounted to him 
for this money. 
In any event, the money did not bewng to Wagner 
but it belonged to Precisa A.G. (R. 231) (Ex. 35), 
and there is not one jot of evidence in this record to 
the effect that Precisa at any time was displeased with 
Bridwell and was not completely satisfied with the 
disposition of this money. Indeed, the letter from 
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Bieler in February of 1962 shows that throughout the 
entire proceeding Precisa was completely satisfied 
and happy with the representation of Bridwell. 
It may be sta~ed in pa.ssing that the only mone,IJ 
that TV agner ever paid out of his own pocket was the 
$2,000.00 which he sent Bridwell for the purpose of the 
September 1961 trip to Switzerland. Everything else, 
both expenses and fees, was paid by Precisa. 
(F) THE CHANDELIER INCIDENT. 
The Hearing Committee found as a fact that 
Bridwell requested a government auctioneer to with-
hold a chandelier from the public sale, and that his 
purchase of the chandelier on the following day when 
no other competitive bidders were expected to be present 
was a representation of conflicting interests. 
This finding is typical of the unbased blanket 
charges made by the complaining witness in this case 
and is cont.rary to the evidence in the record. 
To begin with, the only evidence concerning the 
chandelier incident is Bridwell's testimony. Wagner 
was not present at the auction and had no knowledge 
except that a chandelier was purchased by Bridwell 
at the auction and later given by Bridwell to a friend. 
There is no evidence in the record that the auction 
was continued at Bridwell' s request. Bridwell testified 
that Mr. Doxie, the Government representative who 
was conducting the auction, asked him if it was all right 
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for the auction to be continued. Bridwell did not ask 
for the coninuance, Doxie did. The reason why Doxie 
asked for the continuance was that there was an indi-
cation from a representative of Salt Lake Light and 
Fixture Co. that this company could probably pay 
substantially more money for the chandelier than had 
been indicated. Bridwell' s only purpose in agreeing 
with Doxie to the continuance was for the benefit of 
\Vagner. There is no evidence to the contrary. At any 
rate, according to Bridwell's testimony, the auction was 
continued and all persons present notified as to the exact 
date that the auction would continue. Bridwell testi-
fied that at the time the auction was resumed he was 
present as well as others, and the possibility of a sub-
stantial bid from Salt Lake Light & Fixture Co. did 
not materialize. Bridwell further testified that the 
highest bid that could be obtained was $145.00 and 
that he upped the bid to $150.00, which was the high 
bid. 
Certainly, Bridwell topping the bi<l could be noth-
ing but a benefit to Wagner. There is no way in the 
world to believe that anything Bridwell did in regard 
to this incident was done for any other reason than to 
benefit \Vagner. How the Hearing Committee could 
lrnve made the finding it did in the face of the evi,dence 
in this record is beyond comprehension. 
This charge is utterly unfounded and ridiculous 
in the extreme. 
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(G) CONFLICTING INTERESTS RE 
BUILDING SALE. 
The complaint filed by the Bar against llridwell 
charged him with "allowing the foreclosure of a con-
tra.ct of sale in the name of t}te client's corporation for 
a building located at 375 West Fourth South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, through failure to make proper pay-
rnents with client's funds then available." At the time 
of argument, counsel for the Bar admitted that the evi-
dence did not sustain the charge as originally made 
and moved that the complaint be amended to conform 
to the evidence to the effect that there was a conflict of 
interest to the detriment of Wagner and Precisa, evi-
denced by the manner in which Bridwell handled the 
transactions involving the building ( R. 463, 464) . 
'Ve objected to this amendment, especially in vie\Y 
of the fact that the Bar had two and a half years in 
which to make the amendment and five years to obtain 
the evidence. Also we objected for the reason that 
this was a new charge (R. 464, 465). However, the 
Committee allowed the amendment and in its Findings 
of Fact held that Bridwell was guilty of a conflict of 
interest in representing Schubach, Wagner and Precisa 
m the building transaction (R. 463, 464). 
It is our contention that the evidence did not show 
any conflict of interest on the part of Bridwell to the 
detriment of anyone and that further, there could be 
no conflict of interest in any event inasmuch as full 
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di.sclosure had been made to Precisa and Wagner and 
they had ratified the entire matter. 
Our argument that the Committee allowing the 
amendment has denied Bridwell procedural due pro-
cess of law will be dealt with later. 
Bridwell testified, and his letter to Wagner of 
May 19, 1961 (Ex. 5) bears him out, that he informed 
Wagner of the fact that the building had gone into 
default and that he had obtained an op'tion which was 
exercised by his friend Schubach. The wording of 
]~rid well' s letter to Wagner indicates that this matter 
had been discussed at a prior time when he stated in 
part as follows : 
"A"lso, as you undoubtedly are aware, Mr. 
Hines foreclosed the contract on the Precisa 
building approximately 2 years ago. At that 
time, anticipating that our tax problems would 
be resolved I obtained an option to repurchase 
the building on behalf of Precisa at a sum that 
would bring the contract current at an increased 
interest rate and at a sum that would reimburse 
Mr. Hines for expenses of his attorney. * * * 
At that time, the company had absolutely no 
money, of course, so one of my clients advanced 
the money, which was very risky, because as you 
will recall there was a great deficiency deter-
mined against the corporation. However, that 
has been resolved and the corporation is no 
longer in jeopardy as pertains to any property 
it might own. But my present problem is that 
mv client now wants title to the building or else 
a ·~·ei;ayment of the funds advanced by him to 
57 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
secure the building together with a profit for 
the risk he undertook. His actual expenditures 
to date are in excess of the sum of $10,000.00. 
Pl(f.'lse let me know what Mr. Jost and Pre-
cisa A.G., the principal stockholders in Precisa 
desire to be done with that building. My client 
would like an answer as pertains to that as 
rapidly as may be possible." 
Bridwell and Schubach both testified that as of 
that time and later, Schubach had been willing to merely 
receive his money back plus some interest in order to 
turn the building back to Precisa. However, Bridwell 
testified that Precisa and "\¥" agner as of that time were 
unwilling to put more money into the building due to 
the fact that the tax cases had not been completely 
settled and that there was still some risk that the money 
could be lost. 
At any rate, when Bridwell went to Switzerland 
in the first part of September, 1961, this entire matter 
was discussed with Wagner and with the corporation, 
and the minutes of the corporation contained a com-
plete recital as to everything that had happened in 
regard to the building. Wagner and the principals of 
Precisa all signed the minutes approving of everything 
that Bridwell had done in regard to the building trans-
action. The minutes further stated: 
"(g) Under possessed authority, counsel exer-
cised the option for the company, then for the 
company he conveyed that right to Robert M. 
Schubach, which we ratify; it didn't harm us as 
we had no funds available. 
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(h) Mr. Schubach is a dose personal friend 
of George E. Bridwell, who is also his personal 
attorney. We commend Mr. Schubach on his 
confidence and courage in advancing such sums 
at that time upon little understanding of issues 
and great risk of law suits, attachments and loss. 
( i) The building is and would be lost to this 
company and we acknowledge and affirm it, 
and being fully informed and apprised of all such 
matters, it was upon unanimous vote, 
RESOLVED: 
1. To ratify, consent to and affirm the act 
of counsel in exercising said option for the com-
pany and thereafter giving it to Robert M. Schu-
bach, the building then lost to the company in 
any event, and 
2. To ratify, consent to and affirm all ac-
tions of counsel in the Hines lawsuit, and all 
other matters pertaining to the building and 
allied therewith, and 
* * * 
4. To expressly authorize counsel, under his 
general power of attorney and the powers herein 
given to do such things as may be necessary, 
desirable or useful to perfect title in Robert M. 
Schubach or his designees, and 
5. To request counsel to ask Robert M. Schu-
bach, not oblige him, that he give to the Com-
pany or Ernst Jost or to Eugene 'i\T agner, the 
first right of refusal to purchase or lease that 
building at the same terms as any bona fide offer 
he may receive and desires to take and accord 
to us 30 days from the date of such offer that 
right, we among us to decide which if any of us, 
would so act." 
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After Wagner returned to this country, he nego-
tiated with Schubach for the purchase of this building. 
Bridwell testified that Schubach and Wagner did their 
own negotiating exclusively and there is no evidence 
rebutting this. Both parties arrived at the figure of 
$35,000.00 as a fair sale price and, accordingly, Schu-
bach sold the property to Wagner for the sum of 
$35,000.00. Bridwell's sole participation in this matter 
was in preparing the promissory note which Wagner 
signed for a balance of a little over $2,000. 
As stated, the evidence showed that at the time the 
building contract went into default there was no 
money in the corporate account and the principals of 
Precisa and Wagner were unwilling to send more money 
to keep the contract alive. Accordingly, Bridwell' s ac\ 
was done solely for the benefit of the company in keep· 
ing the building contract alive and enabling a friendly 
person to purchase the same. 
The sale of the building to Wagner was entirely 
within the spirit of the minutes which requested that 
Schubach give the Company, Jost or Wagner the first 
opportunity to repurchase the building. Wagner was 
not harmed in any manner in this transaction inasmuch 
as he was able to purchase the building at a fair price 
and obtain it in his own name. Prior to that time the 
corporation owned the building, Wagner being a mi-
nority stockholder with less than one-fifth of the stock 
of the corpora ti on. 
Bridwell and Schubach were not disputed in their 
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testimony that up to the time of Bridwell's trip to Switz-
erland in the first part of September 1961, Schubach 
would have been willing to have received his money back 
plus some interest for the building. Schubach testified 
that his offer involved no profit but merely interest for 
the time his money was tied up (R. 137). However, it 
can be appreciated that after the threat of Government 
intervention was removed by the total settlement of 
the tax cases, a different situation existed. At that 
time, there was no further jeopardy to Schubach of 
having the Government upset his purchase of this build-
ing and, therefore, he could deal with it as a full owner. 
Certainly the fact that Schubach made a $10,000.00 
profit should not be used against Bridwell in this matter. 
Bridwell' s function was merely to attempt in some way 
to save the building so that it could at a later date be 
repurchased and this he did. Inaction on Bridwell' s 
part very likely would have resulted in a complete loss 
of the building to the company and Wagner. 
The evidence is undisputed that Bridwell received 
nothing from this transaction and had no participation 
at all in regard to the negotiations between Wagner 
and Schubach. Accordingly, there could have been no 
conflict of interest on Bridwell' s part and there could 
be no prejudice to Wagner on account of anything done 
by Bridwell. Precisa, the owner, has made no complaint 
whatsoever, and, indeed, ratified everything that Brid-
well did. 
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(H) WITHDRAWAL OF ADDITIONAL 
FEES WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION 
In paragraph (g) of its }~indings, the Hearing 
Committee found that Bridwell's withdrawal of sums 
of money over the original $14,000 was without the 
authorization or knowledge of the client. The Com-
mittee further held that the action of Bridwell in 
preparing and securing the adoption of the minutes of 
the stockholders' meeting in Switzerland were for his 
own protection in order to exonerate himself from any 
wrong-doing or excuse any previous conduct for which 
he felt he might ultimately have some responsibility 
to his client. This finding is without any basis in the 
record. 
To begin with, in Bridwell' s first letter concerning 
fee arrangements, he made it clear that he was to have 
carte blanche authority to hire any accounting services 
which he felt necessary and, further, that he was to make 
periodic withdrawals of fees. Bridwell made no secret 
of any withdrawals which he made on fees inasmuch as 
he drew checks on the company's account, and the can-
celled checks were sent to the company's place of busi-
ness and presumably forwarded to Wagner and the 
company in Switzerland. Certainly Bridwell was not 
responsible to see that employees of the company for-
warded bank accountings to the owners. 
At the time of 'the first trip to Switzerland, Brid-
well had drawn in excess of the original $14,000 and 
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had used the $4,000 from Metropolitan Finance to 
pay for the trip. These matters were discussed with 
vVagner at the time of that trip. Nielson supported 
Bridwell's testimony that Wagner agreed that the fee 
would be greater than the original $14,000.00. 
During the later trip in September of 1961 when 
all of the accountings and records were turned over 
to Wagner, Wagner and the company both agreed 
to all of the fees that had been paid to Bridwell in the 
past and substantial additional fees in the future. Even 
in Wagner's self-serving letter of December 2 5, 1961, 
some two or three months after returning to the United 
States, Wagner referred to the meetings in Switzer• 
land in September and to the minutes and general powel 
of attorney and stated in part: 
"Eventually, after a lengthy discussion of 
seven hours, it was understood, that the fee situa-
tion as presented that day would be accepted and 
you promised not to draw one more dime, except 
paying a few thousand dollars to Frank, which 
money would come out of the amount due under 
the liabilities." 
Certainly this letter of Wagner's in which he presented 
the matter in a light most favorable to himself, sub-
stantiated the fact that both he and the company had 
accepted all of the accountings which Bridwell had 
presented in September 1961. 
It appears to be inconceivable that Wagner could 
complain that all of the fees taken over and above 
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$14,000 by Bridwell were without authorization when 
both he and the company ratified all fees to the time of 
September 1961 and agreed that further substantial 
fees were due and owing to Bridwell. Wagner's later 
statement in his letter of December 25, 1961 is proof 
positive that he and the company fully agreed to these 
fees as stated in the minutes. 
It may be noted that at no t,ime has anyone con-
tended that Bridwell's fee was not reasonable for the 
services rendered. It may further be noted that Precisu 
paid all but $2,000 of Bridwell' s fees and expenses and 
there is not one iota of evidence that Precisa was and 
is not completely satisfied with everything. 
(I) ACCEPTING LABOR AND MATE-
RIALS WITHOUT PROPERLY AC-
COUNTING FOR SAME. 
Bridwell's contention in regard to this charge is 
that this should have been a proper matter for an ac-
counting between the parties. He frankly admits that 
he accepted labor and materials for the construction 
of a basement bar. Bridwell testified that he had rented 
the building to one Joe Looser, who fell behind in the 
payment of rent. Looser volunteered to do some work 
and Bridwell accepted this work and paid Looser some 
money in addition to what Looser owed the company. 
Bridwell has at all times been willing to account for 
this as well as for the sums which he has advanced out 
of his own pocket. However, he has not been given an 
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opportunity to do this in view of the fact that Wagner 
chose more drastic means to try to settle this account. 
Again we say that this charge is typical of the shotgun 
approach which was used in this case and is a trivial, 
nit-picking charge. 
POINT III. THE CORPORATE MINUTES 
AND GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY 
CONSTITUTE A COMPLETE DISCLOSURE 
AND RATIFICATION OF BRIDWELL'S 
REPRESENTATION OF WAGNER AND 
PRECISA. 
In its findings, the Hearing Committee has com-
pletely ignored the minutes of the stockholders' meeting 
held in Switzerland on September 8, 1961. These min-
utes were signed by Precisa A.G., Ernst Jost and 
Eugene Wagner. The Hearing Committee disposes 
peremptorily of these minutes by simply saying that 
Bridwell secured them for his own protection. Cer-
tainly Bridwell' s motives can have no bearing and 
the fact remains that this large corporation, its ma~ 
jority shareholder and Eugene Wagner all willingly 
signed these minutes. As a matter of fact, Wagner 
not only signed the minutes but typed them up and 
hired his own independent Swiss counsel to assist in 
persuading the Board of Directors of Precisa A.G. 
to accept and to sign them. Apparently the Hearing 
Committee believed that Bridwell as a stranger coming 
into the country of Switzerland and not even speaking 
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the language could completely dominate and overcome 
all of these people and force them to do something 
against their will. 
There was not one jot of evidence to show that 
Precisa and Jost did not intend to agree to these min-
utes or thereafter desired to repudiate them. As a 
matter of fact, the Bieler letter in February of 1962, 
indicates a friendly relationship and a complete satis-
faction on the part of Precisa to the representation of 
Bridwell. 
The only person who has attempted to repudiate 
these minutes is Wagner and even Wagner in Decem-
ber 1961 indicates his complete agreement with the 
minutes except for the matter of additional fees. 
The minutes state as follows: 
"I. To ratify, consent to, affirm and approve 
all settlements and offers of settlement to this 
date, and 
2. To ratify, consent, acknowledge and affirm 
that all travel expenses, accounting fees and 
legal fees, as reflected by the above mentioned 
accountings, pre_l'ared by Fnrnk Nielson,C.P.A., 
of Nielson, Psarras and Nilson, C.P.A.'s, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, be, and they hereby are ac-
cepted and ack.-101\+~J<:red a'> being a valid an(l 
reasonable and just obligation of the Corpora-
tion, no part of which is, has been, or will inure 
for payment of fees for Eugene Wagner in his 
personal tax cases, he being indebted to George 
E. Bridwell for fees for personal representation 
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in a substantial sum, $2,000 of which has been 
paid to this date, and 
3. That the expenses of George E. Bridwell' s 
1961 trip to Switzerland be assumed, paid and 
discharged by Mr. Wagner, since the company 
paid such expenses for both Mr. Nielsen and 
Mr. Bridwell in 1958, and 
4. It being fully understood that as a result 
and consequence of the protracted and continu-
ing and exacting technical and mechanical and 
academic nature of professional services rendered 
to date and to be rendered in the future to time 
of full conclusion, coupled with the realized and 
acknowledged superior results achieved to date 
it is understood there are further substantial fees, 
validly and avowedly due as a corporate obliga-
tion for legal and accounting services rendered 
and to be rendered, to George E. Bridwell and 
Frank Nielsen, and George E. Bridwell shall 
be and he is hereby authorized to make and 
authorize such corporate obligations and pay-
ment therefor as he may deem fit, in accord here-
with and in accord with the General Power of 
Attorney to be given him as hereinafter set forth 
in this Resolution, and 
5. It being understood and realized that full 
and total designation of all corporate powers be 
delegated as to all matters now known and that 
may become known for such independent and 
immediate action as may be necessary, useful or 
desirable for the furtherance, winding up or con-
tinuance of the affairs of the company, a broad 
and General Power of Attorney shall be exe-
cuted by us, for and on behalf of the Company 
and by the Company to George E. Bridwell, 
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which power, we direct, after proper executing 
be delivered to George E. Bridwell." 
The minutes then continued to outline in detail the 
history of the building transaction and the fact that the 
option had been exercised by Schubach, and ratified 
all of the acts stated, and requested that the Company, 
Jost or Wagner be given the first right of refusal to 
repurchase the building at the market price. 
These corporate minutes and the general power 
of attorney which were signed by Wagner, Jost and 
the corporation contain a complete disclosure of every-
thing done in this case and a ratification on the part 
of these parties of everything done by Bridwell. The 
corporation has not complained and it is inconceivable 
to m that Wagner should now come 'to the Bar Asso-
ciation of the State of Utah and be heard to complain 
about Bridwell's representation. It is no answer to say 
that Bridwell wanted these corporate minutes signed 
for his own protection. Wagner and the Precisa people 
did not have to sign the minutes. They had independent 
legal advice and signed these minutes in calm delibera-
tion. 
If Bridwell' s representation had been as stated by 
Wagner, then certainly they would have fired Bridwell 
and obtained new counsel. However, they chose to 
continue with Bridwell and were pleased with his work. 
Wagner, as a minority stockholder and as a freeloader 
who only paid $2,000 of the total, should not now be 
allowed to complain to the Bar and this Court about 
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Bridwell after he received most of the benefits and 
assumed little of the burdens. 
POINT IV. NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
WAS SHOWN. 
Conflict of interest is defined as when on behalf 
of one client it is the lawyer's duty to contend for that 
which duty to another client requires him to oppose. 
See Canons of Professional Ethics, Section 6, and Zim-
rner v. Gudmundsen, 5 N.W.2d 707, 715, 142 Neb. 260. 
The evidence in this case fails to show any conflict of 
interest on the part of Bridwell. The findings found a 
conflict of interest both in regard to the chandelier 
incident and the building transaction. In neither case 
was there any evidence that Bridwell was representing 
conflicting interests within the above definition. The 
evidence showed that the continuance of the auction was 
reqnes~ed not by Bridu·dl ln 1 t h!J the auctioneer and 
Bridwell merely consented in the interest of attempting 
to obtain more money for Wagner for the chandelier. 
The fact that Bridwell later outbid the highest bidder 
shows a further effort to benefit Wagner. There was 
and could be no conflict of interest in that situation. 
As far as the building incident was concerned, the 
only possible purpose that Bridwell could have in 
obtaining the option and persuading Schubach to 
invest his own money, was to keep the building from 
getting into unfriendly, strange hands. Of course the 
Government had to be satisfied and it was the true fact 
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that Schubach' s purchase of the building was a bona 
fide transaction. At a later date, after the Government 
was out of the case, Schubach merely acted like any 
other seller of land, bargaining with Wagner for a fair 
sale price. There was no evidence that Bridwell had 
anything to do with these negotiations. The only thing 
that Bridwell did was to prepare a promissory note in 
accordance with the agreement which had been reached 
by ""\\T agner and Schubach. There could be no conflict 
of interest in this transaCtion. 
POINT V. THERE CAN BE NO CON-
FLICT OF INTEREST WHERE COMPLETE 
DISCLOSURE IS MADE. 
It is settled that disclosure and consent is a com-
plete defense to any charge of improper conduct on 
account of representing conflicting interests. It is stated 
at 17 A.L.R.3d, 839, "It has been held that an attorney 
at law has a duty not to represent clients with con-
flicting interests without making a full disclosure to 
them of the facts concerning such conflict and obtaining 
their consent to such representµtion." See Canons of 
Professional Ethics, Section 6. 
We submit that a complete disclosure was made 
and consent obtained in this case as shown by the un-
disputed evidence. Prior to the time of the September 
1961 trip to Switzerland, Bridwell had informed 
Wagner of what had been done in regard to the build-
ing. At the time of the meetings in September 1961, 
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further discussion was held, and, ultimately, the minutes 
were prepared by Bridwell and Wagner and were 
signed by the corporation, Jost and Wagner. These 
minutes show full disclosure, consent and ratification 
as to what was done with the building and what was to 
be done in the future. There can be no conflict of 
interest in such a case. 
At a subsequent time, in accordance with the re-
quest in the minutes, Schubach gave Wagner an oppor-
tunity to purchase the property at a fair market price 
and he and Wagner both agreed on the price. No one 
twisted Wagner's arm. He did not have to buy the 
building. The evidence is undisputed that Bridwell had 
no participation in these negotiations. 
Accordingly, for this reason alone, the conflict of 
interest charge must be dismissed. 
POINT VI. BRIDWELL WAS DEPRIVED 
OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS WHEN 
THE BAR 'VAS ALLOWED TO ADD A NE'V 
CHARGE IlY AMENDMENT IN THE HEAR-
ING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE. 
The ruling in the recent c:i.s·.~ of In the M attcr 
of Ruffalo, supra, requires tb:tt the added charge of 
representing conflicting interests in regard to the 
building transaction, be di~;rnis~ed for the reason that 
Bridwell was depriYe<l of proc~dural due process. 
The Ruffalo c~se dealt with a disbarment proceed-
ing in the State of Ohio, where the petitioner was 
71 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
charged with various acts of misconduct. Among 
other things, he was charged with soliciting business in 
F.E.L.A. cases through an agent. In the hearing of 
this matter, both petitioner and the agent testified to 
the effect that Ruffalo had hired the agent merely to 
investigate F.E.L.A. cases. Their testimony showed 
that the agent was a railroader employed by a railroad 
which was sometimes involved in cases investigated by 
the agent. Immediately after the hearing, the Board 
added a charge by amendment against petitioner based 
on his hiring an agent to investigate his own employer. 
This disbarment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Ohio and Petition for Certiorari was denied. In a 
Federal Court Order to Show Cause proceeding, the 
petitioner complained that he had been denied proce-
dural due process by not being notified of the new charge 
and tried on said charge without an adequate oppor-
tunity to defend. The Supreme Court of the United 
States held that the petitioner was deprived of proce-
dural due process which includes fair notice of the 
charge, and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the 
Federal District Court. The Court stated at p. 1226: 
"Disbarment, designed to protect the public, 
is a punishment or penalty imposed on the law-
yer. citing cases * * * He is accordingly entitled 
to procednral due process, which includes fair 
notice of the charge. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507, 92 L.Ed. 682. It 
was said in Randall v. Brigham, 7 'iV all. 523, 
540, 19 L.Ed. 285, that when proceedings for 
disbarment are 'not take1 1 for matters occurring 
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in open court, in the presence of the judges 
notice should be given to the attorney of th~ 
charges made and opportunity afforded him for 
explanation and defense.' Therefore, one of the 
conditions this Court considers in determining 
whether disbarment by a State should be fol-
lowed by disbarment here is whether 'the state 
procedure from want of notice or opportunity to 
be heard was wanting in due process.' 
* * * The charge must be known before the 
proceedings commence. They become a trap 
when, after they are under way, the charges are 
amended on the basis of testimony of the accused. 
He can then be given no opportunity to expunge 
the earlier statements and start afresh. * * * 
This absence of fair notice as to the reach of 
the grievance procedure and the precise nature 
of the charges deprived the petitioner of pro-
cedural due process.'' 
It is submitted that the case at Bar falls squarely 
within the holding of the Ruffalo case. In the case at 
Bar, Bridwell was charged with failing to use money 
then available to maintain the contract. After the Bar 
had failed to prove the charge in the complaint and 
Bridwell had testified, the prosecutor moved to amend 
by adding the new charge that Bridwell represented con-
flicting interest in regard to the building transaction. 
The amendment was allowed and the Hearing Commit-
tee found against Bridwell on it. This is squarely 
against the holding of the Ruffalo case which holds 
that in order for Bridwell to be afforded the guarantee 
of procedural due process he must be given fair notice 
of the charge. 
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The original complaint by the complaining witness 
in this matter was made on October 1, 1962, and the 
hearing was not held until nearly six years later. Cer-
tainly during that period of time the Bar had ample 
opportunity to investigate the matter and to make a 
correct charge. To allow the Bar to amend after accused 
has fully testified on the matter and then find accused 
guilty is the worst sort of an injustice and squarely 
violates the right of procedural due process as provided 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. For this reason alone, 
this charge must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission has failed to recognize and dis-
charge one of its most fundamental responsibilities, that 
of protecting a respected member of the Utah Bar from 
an unwarranted attack by a malcontented ex-client. It 
has ignored the fact that the accused is clothed with 
the presumption of innocence, is an officer of the court, 
and has a good reputation for truthfulness and veracity 
in this community. It has ignored the fact that the 
accuser, on the other hand, is a man of shoddy character 
and reputation. 
A number of questions remain unanswered. 
I. Why did the Hearing Committee and the Com-
mission ignore the corporate minutes and the general 
power of attorney which constitute a complete vindica-
tion of Bridwell? 
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2. Why did the Hearing Committee and the Com-
mission ignore the unprecedented lapse of time between 
charge and hearing? 
3. Why did the Hearing Committee and the Com-
mission allow the amendment? 
4. Why did the Hearing Committee and the Com-
mission take the word of Wagner over Bridwell? 
5. Why did the Hearing Committee and the Com-
mission find a violation of ethics with regard to such 
trivial matters as the chandelier incident and the used 
brick incident? 
6. How could Bridwell by letter and telegram 
completely overwhelm a shrewd businessman and a 
giant corporation 5,000 miles away and by duress and 
undue influence force them to give him an undeserved 
fee? 
7. vVhy did 'V agner secrete the three checks and 
flash them on Bridwell for the first time nearly seven 
years later? 
8. If the Government, Precisa, and Wagner were 
satisfied with the accountings rendered by Bridwell and 
Nielson why not the Commission? Should they in all 
fairness actually expect receipts for meals and hotel 
bills after ten years? 
9. How can Wagner complain about the building 
transaction when he derived a substantial benefit from 
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it and entered into it voluntarily and with his eyes 
wide open? 
It is clear that George Bridwell was denied his 
right to a speedy trial and that he is innocent. For 
these reasons we urge his vindication. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN L. BLACK 
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS & 
:BLACK 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for George E. Bridwell 
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